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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
Jurisdiction lies with this Court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989).

This appeal is taken from the

March 21, 1989, final judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable Scott Daniels presiding,
denying defendant John P. Pizzello?s Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment?
2.

Was defendant denied due process, both under the

United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution?
3.

Did the trial court err in concluding that it had

obtained jurisdiction upon the defendant John P. Pizzello through
valid service of process.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
United States Constitution, Amendment Fourteen, §1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside. No state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of the citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Utah Constitution, Article I, §7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.

~1»

Utah Constitution, Article I, §11:
All courts shall be open, and every person for
an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have a remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in the state,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:

See Addendum A.
See Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A-

Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings and
Disposition of the Court Below.
The controversy in the instant appeal arises out of an

automobile accident which occurred on April 16, 1986.
bile accident involved a vehicle driven and owned

The automo-

by defendant

Dale W. Gertz and a vehicle driven by plaintiff Pamela E.
Gillespie, which vehicle was owned by plaintiff Jerry Gillespie.
(R. 2-3).
The Gillespies filed a complaint against the defendant
Gertz on or about June 30, 1987.

(R. 2 ) . Thereafter, on or about

January 7, 1988, plaintiffs amended their complaint to include
defendant Sprinklers, Sod and Such and John P. Pizzello.

(R. 22).

On October 11, 1988, a default judgment was entered
against defendant John P. Pizzello based upon the affidavit of the
process server indicating that service had been obtained against
the defendant Pizzello.

(R. 38-39).

On January 9, 1989, within three months of the default
judgment, defendant Pizzello, through counsel, filed a motion to
-2-

set aside judgment along with a memorandum in support of motion to
set aside default.

(R. 47-48).

Plaintiffs' counsel filed its memorandum in opposition on
or about January 23, 1989, and defendant Pizzello filed his reply
memorandum on or about January 26.

Also filed with the reply

memorandum was a request to submit the motion for a decision.
(R. 49-58).
On January 31, 1989, plaintiffs filed a request for oral
argument and hearing.

However, on January 17, 1989, without oral

argument, the Honorable Scott Daniels caused to be filed a minute
entry denying defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment.
(R. 66-67; 73) .
B*

Statement of Facts.
1.

The vehicle that was driven by Mr. Gertz which was

involved in the April 16, 1986 automobile accident was owned by
defendant Gertz but was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued to defendant John P. Pizzello by Guaranty National
Insurance Company.

(R. 43). The vehicle involved in the accident

was a 1984 Chevrolet S-10, Utah License No. AH4-557.
2.

(R. 2 ) .

On April 16, 1986, plaintiff Pamela Gillespie was

stopped behind cars proceeding south on State Street, at the
intersection of 3900 South in Salt Lake City.

At that time,

plaintiff was allegedly rear-ended by defendant Gertz while he
was operating the 1984 Chevrolet S-10.
3.

(R. 3 ) .

Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that

defendant Pizzello was involved in a partnership with defendant
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Gertz known as Sprinklers, Sod and Such.

Plaintiffs further

alleged that the defendant Gertz was acting in the course of business conducted by Sprinklers, Sod and Such at the time of the subject accident.
4.

(R. 22-24).

The original complaint filed by the plaintiffs named

only Dale Gertz as defendant.

(R. 2). Following the filing of

the original complaint, plaintiffs filed a subpoena ducus tecum
upon Guaranty National Insurance Company on August 31, 1987
requesting documentation of all insurance policies issued to John
P. Pizzello.
5.

(R. 10).
After receiving information regarding the insurance

of John P. Pizzello, the Gillespies caused to be filed the amended
complaint, naming as defendants Dale W. Gertz, John P. Pizzello,
and Sprinklers, Sod and Such.
6.

(R. 27).

The Gillespies attempted to obtain personal service

upon defendant Pizzello and retained David T. Holland to perfect
service upon Mr. Pizzello.

Mr. Holland attested that he was able

to obtain personal service upon Mr. Pizzello with the summons and
amended complaint on April 21, 1988.
7.

(R. 36-37).

On the back of the return of service, Mr. Holland

wrote that he observed Mr. Pizzello go into what he believed to be
Mr. Pizzello's apartment.

(R. 37). Mr. Holland thereafter went

to the apartment door, rang the doorbell and yelled that he had a
court summons and amended complaint for Mr. Pizzello.

(R. 69).

Mr. Holland attested there was no answer and that no one opened
the door.

(R. 69). Mr. Holland further attested he continued to
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pound on the door and ring the doorbell for approximately 10 minutes with no response.

(R. 70). Mr. Holland then announced that

as an officer of the Salt Lake Court, he was leaving the court
summons and amended complaint at the front door of the apartment
and that by doing so concluded that service had been obtained.
(R. 70). Mr. Holland then attested that approximately five minutes later, he saw whom he believed to be Mr. Pizzello drive away
from the apartment complex.

(R. 71). Mr. Holland allegedly then

went back to the apartment and saw that the summons and amended
complaint which had been left by the door was gone.
8.

(R. 71).

No answer to the complaint was filed by Mr. Pizzello

and on or about October 11, 1988, the Honorable Scott Daniels
entered a default judgment against Mr. Pizzello.
9.

(R. 39).

On January 19, 1989, the defendant John P. Pizzello,

within three months of the date of the default judgment, through
counsel retained by defendant Pizzellofs insurer, moved the court
for a motion to set aside default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 47-48).

Following

exchange of memoranda by the parties, Judge Daniels on January 17,
1989, caused a minute entry to be filed indicating that the
defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment was denied.
Judge Daniels decided the matter without oral argument despite a
request for oral argument from counsel for the Gillespies.

(R.

66-67; 73). On March 21, 1989, an order was signed reflecting the
court's denial of defendant Pizzello's motion to set aside default
judgment.

(R. 74-75).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court abused its discretion in failing to

set aside the default judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court is vested with discretion in setting aside the default judgment.

The Utah Court of

Appeals has held that where a reasonable excuse is offered by a
defaulting party, the courts should generally tend to favor
granting relief from a default judgment particularly where the
adequacy of service of process has not clearly been determined,
2.

The standard established by the Utah Supreme Court

in determining whether a motion to set aside default judgment
should be granted violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution.

Particularly

to the extent that the defendant is required to offer proof of a
meritorious defense when seeking to set aside a default judgment.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a procedural rule
which requires a showing a meritorious defense is unconstitutional
when the requirements imposed is in addition to procedural
requirements which would otherwise justify setting aside a default
judgment.
3.

The requirements of showing a meritorious defense in

addition to the procedural requirements of Rule 60(b) also violate
the Utah Constitution's guarantee of due process. Additionally,
the defendant was deprived of open access to the courts as also
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution.
4.

The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defen-
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dant Pizzello as a result of the invalid service attempted against
defendant Pizzello.

Defendant was not served personally nor was

there a refusal by the defendant to accept a copy of the process.
As such, the court lacked the jurisdiction to enter the default
against the defendant in the first instance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT,
Defendant recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court has held
that the trial court has considerable discretion in considering a
motion to set aside a judgment.

Defendant also acknowledges that

the appellate court will not overturn a denial of a defendant's
motion to set aside default unless there is an abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court.
In citing the above-mentioned rule, the Utah Supreme
Court in Gardiner & Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah
1982), stated:
The trial court has considerable discretion
ruling on a motion to set aside a default
judgment under Rule 60(b) and this Court
will reverse the trial court only where a
clear abuse of discretion is shown. Mayhew
v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52,
376 P.2d 951 (1962); Central Finance Co. v.
Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d 284, 452 P.2d 316
(196 9) ; Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v.
Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973).
Id. at 430.
In Swapp, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion
by the trial court in refusing to set aside a default judgment
-7-

where the trial court entered a default judgment based upon the
defendant's repeated failure to comply with discovery.

The lower

court had held that Swapp's motion to set aside the judgment was
based upon negligence and was therefore not filed within the
three-month time limit of Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,
The Utah Supreme Court on occasion has ruled that the
trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside a
default judgment.

The Supreme Court has not particularly outlined

what would constitute abuse of discretion.

However, the court has

issued general guidelines on the subject.
In Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d
369 (Utah 1980), the court offered the following:
It is not to be questioned that in appropriate circumstances default judgments are
justified; and when they are, they are
invulnerable to attack. However, they are
not favored in the law, especially where a
party has timely responded with challenging
pleadings. When that has been done some
caution should be observed to see that the
party is not taken advantage of. Speaking
generally about such problems, it is to be
kept in mind that access to the courts for
the protection of rights and the settlement
of disputes is the one of the most important
factors in the maintenance of a peaceful and
well ordered society
* * *

The uniformally acknowledged policy of
the law is to accord litigants the
opportunity for a hearing on the merits,
where that can be done without serious
injustice to the other party. To that end,
the courts are generally indulgent toward
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the setting aside of default judgments where
there is a reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendant's failure to
appear, and where timely application is made
to set it aside. Consistent with the objective just stated, where there is doubt about
whether a default should be set aside, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of doing
so, to the end that each party may have an
opportunity to present his side of the
controversy and that there be a resolution
in accordance with the law and justice.
Id. at 371.
In Interstate Excavating, defendant sought reversal of
the denial of its motion based upon Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, to set aside a default judgment.

The plaintiff

filed its complaint in May of 1978. The defendant timely answered
the complaint and asserted an answer and defenses as well as a
counterclaim.

A pretrial conference was held on April 16, 1979,

at which time defendant's counsel made a motion to withdraw, which
motion was granted.

The court instructed plaintiff's attorney to

notify the defendant to obtain new counsel.

The court also set

the case for trial for May 7, 1979 despite the defendant's
counsel's withdrawal.

Plaintiff's attorneys certified that on

April 16, notice of the trial setting was mailed to the
defendant's business address.

Defendant's attorney also certified

that he mailed to the defendant a notice of the trial setting and
notice of his withdrawal as counsel. However, the defendant
denied ever receiving notice from his former attorney or the
plaintiff's attorney regarding the trial setting.

The trial date

was set for May 7 and no one appeared on behalf of the defendant.
Judgment was entered by the plaintiff and defendant's counterclaim
-9-

was dismissed.
The defendant argued before the lower court that its
former counsel withdrew from a number of cases simultaneously and
that the notice to appoint counsel may have been misplaced with
other papers served upon the defendant's office by mail.
Defendant further argued in support of its motion to set aside the
default that it had no notice of the trial until it received the
notice of a judgment dated May 14.

Upon receipt of the notice of

judgment, the defendant immediately contacted present counsel, who
then filed the motion to set aside the default.

In overturning

the lower court's denial to set aside the default judgment, the
Supreme Court stated:
Application of the principles discussed
herein to the instant situation leads us to
the conclusion that the interests of justice
will best be served by setting aside the
default judgment and giving the parties that
opportunity. In that connection, we call
attention to the prefatory clause of Rule
60(b) that "upon such terms as are just" a
party may be relieved from judgment. This
authorizes the trial court to impose such
terms as may be just as a condition to
setting aside the default.
Id. at 371.
Under the facts of the instant case, this court is
justified in concluding that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to grant defendant's motion to set aside the
default.

There is a genuine issue as to whether or not the serv-

ice of process upon Mr. Pizzello was adequate.

The alleged serv-

ice upon Mr. Pizzello did not comply with Rule 4(e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and there is no evidence offered by the
-10-

plaintiff that the defendant was refusing service.

Without per-

sonal service in this matter, as will be discussed in greater
detail below, the trial court may have lacked jurisdiction to
enter a default judgment.

At the least, the court abused its dis-

cretion when service upon the defendant was questionable.
Additionally, defendant should have been relieved of
judgment based upon excusable neglect.

The plaintiffs' only

allegation against Mr. Pizzello is that he was in partnership with
Mr. Gertz in a business known as Sprinklers, Sod and Such.

The

plaintiffs allege that Mr. Gertz was acting in the scope of his
business at the time of the automobile accident.

However, in

answer to the plaintiffs1 amended complaint, Mr. Gertz
specifically denied that he was acting in the course and scope of
his business when he was involved in the accident with Pamela
Gillespie.

There is no evidence to substantiate the plaintiffs'

claims that Mr. Pizzello had any liability to the plaintiffs for
the damages caused.

Therefore, assuming the amended complaint and

summons was served upon Mr. Pizzello, he was at worst liable for
excusable neglect for failing to act on the matter.
The trial court erred in failing to liberally grant
relief from judgment and in so doing denied the defendant his
opportunity to be heard on the merits of the matter.

If the

defendant in Interstate Excavating was granted relief from judgment so that the interests of justice would be served by giving
the parties an opportunity to litigate the merits of the case, it
would appear that this defendant should also be granted the same
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relief by this court.
POINT II.
THE "MUSSELMAN STANDARD" ESTABLISHED BY THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State By and
Through Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1983), outlined three requirements that must be met by a defendant
in order to be relieved from default judgment.

Those requirements

include a showing that the judgment was entered against the defendant through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in
Rule 60(b)); a showing that the defendant's motion to set aside
the judgment was timely; and a showing of a meritorious defense to
the action.
In the underlying action of the instant case, the
defendant cited the Musselman case in its memorandum in support of
motion to set aside judgment and argued to the court that the
requirements outlined in Musselman had been met by the defendant
Pizzello and as such, the defendant should be entitled to relief
from default judgment.
The lower court on refusing to set aside the default
judgment must have determined that the defendant had failed to
meet one or more of the three-part test developed by the Supreme
Court in Musselman.

The defendant's motion, however, was timely

as it was filed within three months of the date of judgment.
Additionally, the defendant argued that he was entitled to have
the default set aside on the basis of mistake, inadvertence,
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surprise or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Additionally, the defendant argued that

relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4) which provides that a
party may be relieved from final judgment when the summons in the
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As
two of the three requirements of Musselman were clearly met, it
would appear that the trial court's only basis for refusing to set
aside the default judgment was based upon the failure to show a
meritorious defense to the action.
The defendant did attempt to outline in the memorandum in
support of motion to set aside the default and in the reply
memorandum in support of motion to set aside the default his
meritorious defense to the action. Whether that attempt was
insufficient in showing a meritorious defense should not have been
the determining factor to the denial of his motion.

The need to

show meritorious defense violated the defendant's constitutional
right of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Particularly to the extent that the defendant was required to
offer proof of a meritorious defense when he sought to set aside
the default judgment.
In Gary Fassio v. The Honorable Maurice Jones and
Collection Management Agency, Inc., No. 88-C-965G (D. Utah 1989)
(Memorandum Decision and Order) (see Addendum C), Judge Greene of
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, concluded that the promulgated procedural rule of court developed in

-13-

Musselman which imposed the showing of a meritorious defense before
a default judgment could be vacated was unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
In Fassio, the plaintiff Gary Fassio wrote and issued a
check in the amount of $8.71 to Hires, a Salt Lake City restaurant.
The check was thereafter dishonored for insufficient funds and was
returned to Hires unpaid.

On April 15, 1988, after receiving

notice that the check was not paid, plaintiff mailed a money order
in the amount of $10.00 to Hires to cover the check and to help
defray additional costs. On October 29, 1988, defendant Collection Management Agency, Inc., at the direction of Hires filed a
civil action against Fassio for the collection of the dishonored
check.

Fassio was properly served with a summons and complaint

but believed that the matter was resolved when he sent the money
order to Hires.

Fassio therefore did not file an answer.

On

June 2, 1988, a default was taken in the Third Circuit Court and
on June 9, 1988, default judgment was entered against Mr. Fassio
in the amount of $190.46.
Mr. Fassio then filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 55(c) and
60(b) on August 23, 1988 in the Third Circuit Court.

On September

22, a hearing was held on Fassio's motion to set aside the default
judgment.

The Circuit Court Judge, the Honorable Maurice Jones,

in accordance with the Musselman decision of the Supreme Court of
Utah, denied Fassiofs motion on the basis that he failed to offer
a proof of meritorious defense.
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Fassio then filed in Federal Court under 42 U.S.C. §1983,
alleging deprivation of property without due process of law as
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
In holding that the rule of court outlined in Musselman
by the Supreme Court of Utah violated the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Utah District Court relied upon the
United States Supreme Court decision of Peralta v. Heights Medical
Center, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988).
In Peralta, the Heights Medical Center sued a guarantor
of one of the medical center's debtors to recover on its debt.
Peralta, the guarantor, did not answer or appear in the suit and a
default judgment was entered against him.

The judgment was

recorded and enforced through a writ of attachment.

Unbeknowst to

Peralta, his property was sold and the proceeds were used to satisfy the judgment.

Thereafter, Peralta filed a bill of review in

a Texas state trial court, seeking to set aside the default
judgment.

Heights Medical Center moved for summary judgment,

asserting that the bill of review could be granted and the default
judgment set aside, only where the petitioner showed a meritorious
defense to the action in which judgment had been entered.
conceded that he did not have a meritorious defense.

Peralta

The trial

court granted the summary judgment motion, and denied rehearing,
then Peralta for the first time asserted that entry of the default
judgment violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
On appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals, Peralta repeated
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his claim that requiring a meritorious defense violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the court affirmed and held that whether
or not there was a proper service and notice, the showing of
meritorious defense was required in order to set aside a default
judgment.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and held:
The Texas court held that the default judgment must stand absent a showing of a
meritorious defense to the action which
judgment was entered without proper notice
to the appellant, a judgment that had substantial adverse consequences to the
appellant. By reason of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
holding is plainly infirm.
Where a person has been deprived the
property in a manner contrary to the most
basic tenants of due process, "it is no
answer to say that in this particular case
due process of the law would have lead to
the same result because he had no adequate
defense upon the merits."

Peralta, 99 L.Ed.2d at 82 (quoting Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works,
237 U.S. 413, 424, 59 L.Ed. 1027, 35 S.Ct. 625 (1950)).
In Fassio, the defendants attempted to distinguish
Peralta, based upon the deficiencies which existed with respect to
the service of process and notice.

Defendants argue that the

procedural defects constituted the underlying due process
violation.
However, Judge Greene asserted that had the Supreme Court
considered the Peralta case strictly from a procedural standpoint,
that it could have ruled on the matter on the basis of Mullen v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

Judge

Greene noted that Mullen was the landmark case which established
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the fundamental due process requirement that reasonable notice
must be given.

Judge Greene concluded:

It appears that the Supreme Court went
beyond Mullen when it decided Peralta by
effectively holding that a procedural rule
which requires the showing of a meritorious
defense is unconstitutional when that
requirement is imposed in addition to
procedural requirements which otherwise
would justify setting aside a default
judgment. This court interprets Peralta to
stand for the proposition that it is a
denial of due process of law to foreclose a
consideration of setting aside a default
judgment because of required showing of a
meritorious defense. When a default judgment otherwise should be set aside because
of improper notice or for any of the grounds
set forth in Rules 55(c) and 60(b), such as
mistake or inadvertence, to impose the additional requirements of showing the existence
of a meritorious defense is to deny a defendant due process.
Gary Fassio v. The Honorable Maurice Jones and Collection
Management Agency, Civil No. 88-C-965G, United States District
Court, District of Utah, Memorandum Decision Order, p. 16 (1989).
The defendant in the instant action was denied due
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment when he
was required to establish a meritorious defense in order to be
relieved from judgment.

Based upon that violation, the defendant

should be entitled to have the default judgment set aside.
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POINT III.
THE REQUIREMENT OF A NEED TO SHOW A
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE IN ORDER TO BE RELIEVED
OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS A VIOLATION OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS
AS WELL AS A VIOLATION OF THE OPEN ACCESS
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
As early as 1945, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized
that an essential requirement of due process is that every citizen
be afforded his day in court.

In a habeas corpus action in

Christensen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
The phrase "due process of law" apparently
originated in our judicial parlance with Lord
Coke who in construing the language of Magna
Carta "that no man shall be taken or imprisoned-or deprived of life, liberty or property but by
the judgment of his peers or the law of the land"
said that the phrase, "law of the land" meant
"due process of law", which definition is the
language used in our Constitution. Many attempts
have been made to further define "due process"
but they all resolve into the thought that a
party shall have his day in court—that is each
party shall have the right to a hearing before
a competent court, with the privilege of being
heard and introducing evidence to establish his
cause or defense, after which comes judgment
upon the record thus made.
Id. at 316.
More recently, in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control, 650 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
[T]he essential requirement of due process is
that every citizen be afforded his "day in
court." "It has always been the policy of our
law to resolve doubts in favor permitting parties
to have their day in court on the merits of a
controversy."
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Id. at 1296 (quoting Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah
1976).
The fact that a federal district court residing in the
state of Utah has determined that the promulgated procedural rule
of court developed by the Utah Supreme Court in Musselman is
unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution is significant
when interpreting the Utah state constitutional due process
guarantees.

In Untermyer v. State Tax Comm'n, 192 P.2d 881 (Utah

1942), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The due process clause of the state constitution
is substantially the same as the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the due processes clauses of the
Federal Constitution are "highly persuasive" as
to the application of that clause of our state
constitution.
Id. at 885.
In support of the proposition enunciated by the Supreme
Court that the due process favors permitting parties to have their
day in court on the merits of a controversy, the Constitution of
Utah in addition to the general due process requirements contained
in Article I, §7 provide a specific guarantee of access to the
courts in Article I, §11:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him and his person,
property or reputation, shall have a remedy
by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this state,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
By allowing the defendant to be deprived of its day in
-19-

court under the circumstances where service of process is suspect
and the defendant had procedurally complied with the rule for
setting aside a default, offends against both the Article I, §7
guarantee of due process and the Article I, §11 guarantee of
access to the courts.

Such offenses should entitle the defendant

to have the judgment set aside.
POINT IV,
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER
A DEFAULT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT INASMUCH AS
SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS INVALIDThe Utah Supreme Court has adopted the general rule that
a judgment is void and subject to attack if there is a lack of
jurisdiction in the court upon the defendant.

See Bowen v. Olsen,

246 P.2d 602 (Utah 1952).
At the lower court in the instant action, the plaintiffs
argued that the service upon the defendant Pizzello was proper
under Rule 4(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides:
If the person to be served refuses to accept
a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall
state the name of the process and offer to
delivery a copy thereof.
The plaintiffs relied upon the Utah Appellate Court decision of Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1987), where the
Appellate Court stated:
We strongly believe that personal service
should not become a "degrading game of wiles
and tricks" nor should a defendant be able to
defeat service simply by refusing to accept
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the papers or instructing others, suitable
under the Rules of Civil Procedure, also to
reject service.
Id. at 1055. However, the facts of the instant case are substantially different than that in Wood v. Weenig.

There is nothing

in the record to suggest that the defendant Pizzello refused to be
served.
It is conceded that the plaintiffs failed to obtain personal service upon the defendant and obtained the default judgment
through the alternative service provided under Rule 4(i) which
provides for service when a person refuses to accept service.
Mr. Holland, the process server retained by plaintiffs' attorney
attested in his affidavit that he saw an individual enter an apartment designated by the plaintiffs' attorney as that belonging to
defendant Pizzello.

However, at no time was this individual iden-

tified as defendant Pizzello.
Mr. Holland also attested that he saw the individual
enter the designated apartment and then approached the apartment
to attempt to serve the summons and amended complaint.

Mr. Holland

did so by yelling through the door and pounding on it for approximately 10 minutes. At no time, however, was there ever a response
from any individual within said apartment.

Following his futile

efforts to place the summons and amended complaint in the hands of
the individual within the apartment, Mr. Holland announced in a
loud voice that he was an officer of the court and that service of
the summons and amended complaint had been accomplished and that
he was leaving a copy of the summons and amended complaint outside
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the apartment door.
In contrast, in the Woods case relied upon by the plaintiffs, the deputy constable spoke for approximately 10 minutes,
via an intercom, with an individual who identified herself as the
daughter of the individual to be served and admitted that she was
over the age of 14. The daughter refused to open the door to
accept service and stated that she had been instructed by her
father not to accept any legal papers. After having the conversation with the daughter for approximately 10 minutes and having
heard the daughter indicate that she was not to accept legal
papers, the deputy constable then announced that he was leaving
the papers on the porch.

The court in Woods was justified under

those facts in concluding that the person to be served was refusing to accept a copy of the process.
However, under the facts of the instant case, there was
no confirmation that the individual entering the designated apartment was in fact Mr. Pizzello, neither was there any discussion
with Mr. Pizzello, either face to face or through the door of
Mr. Pizzello's residence.

In comparison with the Woods decision,

it appears that the process server in the lower court was not justified in concluding that Mr. Pizzello was refusing to accept
service and that service was thus accomplished under Rule 4(i) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Additionally, the summons and amended complaint was simply left on the doorstep of the designated apartment by Mr.
Holland.

In Business and Professional Adjustments Co. v. Baker,
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659 P.2d 1025 (Or.App. 1983), a case relied upon by the Utah
Appellate Court in Woods v. Weenig, the court held that service of
process was sufficient where papers were placed in a location
where the defendant was likely to encounter them and where they
were unlikely to be blown away or destroyed.

In the instant case,

the papers were certainly not placed in a location where they were
unlikely to be blown away.
From the preceding, the trial court in the instant action
was not justified in concluding that service had been obtained
against defendant Pizzello and erred in entering the default judgment based upon Rule 4(i).

Inasmuch as service was invalid, the

default judgment should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
The defendant has presented several legitimate reasons
for this court to set aside the default judgment entered against
defendant Pizzello.

The lower court abused its discretion in

failing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)
based upon the totality of the factual circumstances and the
unlikelihood of Mr. Pizzellofs responsibility for the damages
incurred by the plaintiffs. Assuming that the defendant Pizzello
was properly served, which assumption is vigorously contested by
this defendant, defendant Pizzello at worse committed excusable
neglect in not filing an answer in an amended complaint which
alleged his only relation to the action as that of being a partner
to an individual involved in an automobile accident.
Additionally, under Rule 60(b)(4), the lower court abused
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its discretion in failing to set aside the default judgment where
personal service was not obtained against the defendant.
The defendant's due process rights guaranteed by both the
Federal Constitution and the Utah Constitution were violated by
the procedural rules promulgated by the Utah Supreme Court in the
Musselman decision requiring a meritorious defense be established
prior to setting aside a default judgment.
Additionally, defendant asserts that the default judgment
is void for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court against the
defendant Pizzello.

The trial court incorrectly assumed and con-

cluded that defendant Pizzello was refusing to accept service and
thus service was not obtained pursuant to Rule 4(i) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Based upon the foregoing, defendant Pizzello respectfully
requests that this court reverse the lower court's denial of the
motion to set aside default judgment.
DATED this
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Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

Rule 4

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 4. Process.
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to have issued when
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service. Separate
summonses may be issued and served.
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon within three months from the
date of such filing. The summons must be served within one year after the
filing of the complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed, provided that in
any action brought against two or more defendants in which personal service
has been obtained upon one of them within the year, the other or others may
be served or appear at any time before trial.
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the
court, the names or designations of the pa'rties to the action, the county in
which it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state the time within which
the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify
him that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered
against him. If the summons be served without a copy of the complaint, or by
publication, it shall briefly state the sum of money or other relief demanded,
and in case of publication of summons such summons as published shall contain a description of the subject matter or res involved in the action. Where
the summons is served without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy of
said complaint will be served upon or mailed to defendant within ten days
after such service or that if the address of defendant is unknown, the complaint will be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after such
service.
(d) By whom served. The summons, and a copy of the complaint, if any,
may be served:
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the county where the service is
made, or by his deputy, or by any other person over the age of 21 years,
and not a party to the action; provided, that this rule shall not abrogate
the provisions of chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1945.
(2) In another state or United States territory by the sheriff of the
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by a United States
marshal or his deputy.
(3) In a foreign country, either:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country; or
(B) upon an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a
corporation or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a
managing or general agent; or
(C) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
(D) as directed by order of the court.
Service under (B) or (D) above may be made by any person who is not a
party and is not less than 21 years of age or who is designated by order of
the court.
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service within the state shall be as
follows:
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering a
copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual place
6
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of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing; or
by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.
(2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering a
copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian; or,
if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care
and control of such minor, or with whom he resides, or in whose service he
is employed.
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy thereof to his
legal guardian.
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive serv&e of process and, if the agent is one authorized
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found in the
county in which the action is brought, then upon any such officer or
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent
having the management, direction or control of any property of such
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the
state. If no such officer or agent can be found in the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of
business in this state, or does business in this state, then upon the person
doing such business or in charge of such office or place of business.
(5) Upon an incorporated city, by delivering a copy thereof to the
mayor or recorder; upon an incorporated town, by delivering a copy
thereof to the president or clerk of the board of trustees.
(6) Upon a county, by delivering a copy thereof to a county commissioner or to the county clerk of such county.
(7) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy
thereof to the president or clerk of the board.
(8) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the
president or secretary of its board.
(9) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be
brought against the state, by delivering a copy thereof to the attorney
general.
(10) Upon a natural person, nonresident of the state of Utah, doing
business in this state at one or more places of business, as set forth in
Rule 17(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to
one of his managers, superintendents or agents.
(11) Upon a department or agency of this state, or upon any public
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secretary.
(12) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the State or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy
to the person who has the care, custody or control of the individual to be
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of
7
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the individual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any
case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served.
(0 Other service.
(1) Service by publication. Where the person upon whom service is
sought resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself
to avoid the service of process, or where such party is a corporation having no officer or other agent upon whom process can be served within this
state, or where in an action in rem some or all of the defendants are
unknown, service of process may be made by publication, as follows:
The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion
verified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order
of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service and shall
show the efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within
this state, and shall give the address, or last known address, of each
person to be served or shall state that the same is unknown. The court
shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been
used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to obtain
the same would have been of no avail, shall order publication of the
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in
which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made at least once
a week for four successive weeks. Within ten days after the order is
entered, the clerk shall mail a copy of the summons and complaint to each
person whose address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be
complete on the day of the last publication.
(2) Alternative to service by publication. In circumstances described in (1) above justifying service of summons by publication, if the
party desiring service of summons shall file a verified petition stating the
facts from which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely
to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that
service of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a copy of the
summons and complaint to the party to be served at his address, or his
last known address. Service shall be complete ten days after such mailing.
(3) Service outside of state. Personal service of a copy of the summons and complaint outside of this state is equivalent to service by publication and deposit in the post office, and shall be complete on the day of
such service.
(g) Manner of proof. Within five days after service of process, proof
thereof shall be made as follows:
(1) if served by a sheriff or United States marshal, or a deputy of either, by his certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner
of service.
(2) if by any other person, by his affidavit thereof, with the same statement.
(3) if by publication by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or his
foreman or principal clerk, showing the same and specifying the date of
the first and last publication; and an affidavit by the clerk of the court of
a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the post office as
prescribed by Subdivision (0 of this rule, if such deposit shall have been
made.
8
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(4) by the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved.
(h) A m e n d m e n t . At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.
(i) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of
the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall
state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof.
(j) Time of service to be e n d o r s e d on copy. At the time of service, the
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and
shall sign his name thereto, and, if an officer, add his official title.
(k) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any proceeding where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall, be made
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and
shall be published in the English language.
(1) Service of process by telegraph or telephone. A summons, writ,
order or other process in any civil action or proceeding, and all other papers
requiring service, may be transmitted by telegraph or telephone for service in
any place within this state, and the telegraphic or telephonic copy of such
process or paper so transmitted may be served or executed by the officer or
other person to whom it is sent for that purpose, and returned by him, if
return is required, in the same manner and with the same force and effect as
the original thereof; and the officer or person serving or executing the same
has the same authority, and is subject to the same liabilities as if the copy
were the original. The process or paper, when a writ or order, must be filed in
the court from which it was issued, and a certified copy thereof must be
preserved in the telegraph or telephone office from which it was sent. The
operator sending the message may use either the original or a certified copy of
the process or paper. Whenever any document to be sent by telegraph or
telephone bears a seal, either private or official, it is not necessary for the
operator in sending the same to telegraph or telephone a description of the
seal, or any word or device thereon, but the same may be expressed in the
telegraphic or telephonic copy by the letters "L.S.," or by the word "Seal."
(m) Service by constable. All writs and process, including executions
upon judgments, issued out of a district, city or justice court in a civil action or
proceeding may be served by any constable of the county.
(Amended, effective March 1, 1988.)
ing to §§ 10-2-110 and 10-3-106, the governing
body of an incorporated town consists of a
council and mayor.
Cross-References. — Collection agencies,
process server in actions by, § 12-1-8.
Condominium association or ownership, service of process on person designated in declaration, § 57-8-33.
Constable, service of process by, §§ 17-22-25,
17-25-1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment added Subdivision (e)(12).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule generally
follows Rule 4, F.R.C.P.
Laws 1945, ch. 28, referred to in Subdivision
(d)(1), appears as § 12-1-8, relating to actions
by collection agencies.
The reference, in Subdivision (e)(5), to the
"president or clerk of the board of trustees" of
an incorporated town seems incorrect. Accord-
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issue was deemed waived and could not be
raised in a motion for new trial. Ute-Cal Land
Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980).
Cited in National Farmers Union Property
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d
249 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435,
326 P.2d 722 (1958); Howard v. Howard, 11
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley v.
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126,
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General Bldrs.
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir
Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318,
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v.
State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); Edgar v.
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com.
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Fin. Corp. v. Brimhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne,
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981);
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gardner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983); Nelson v.
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Golden
Key Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah
1985); York v. Unqualified Washington
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah
1986); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah
1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318
(Utah 1987); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App.
1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. J u r . 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.

Absence of judge from courtoom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
181
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in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent
action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion

to set aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24,
78-6-14; Appx. G, Code of Judicial Administration.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Default judgment.
Jurisdiction.
Other reasons.
—"Any other reason justifying relief."
Default judgment.
Impossibility of compliance with order.
Incompetent counsel.
Lack of due process.
Merits of case.
Mistake or inadvertence.
Real party in interest.
Requirements.
—Effect of set-aside judgment.
Admissions.
—Fraud.

Divorce action.
—Independent action.
Constitutionality of taxes.
Divorce decree.
Fraud or duress.
Motion distinguished.
—Invalid summons.
Amendment without notice.
—Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
Default judgment.
Delayed motion for new trial.
Failure to file cost bill.
Failure to file notice of appeal.
Failure to receive notice and findings.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
Trial court's discretion.
Unemployment compensation appeal.
Workmen's compensation appeal.
—Newly discovered evidence.
Burden of proof.
Discretion not abused.
—Procedure.
——Notice to parties.
—Res judicata.
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
I-

r

DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION

GARY FACIO,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
THE HON. MAURICE JONES, AND
COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AGENCY, INC.,

Civil No. 88-C-965G

Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on December 19, 1988,
on cross motions by the plaintiff and defendant Jones for summary
judgment, and on the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.

Plaintiff Gary Facio was represented by Brian M.

Barnard, defendant the Honorable Maurice Jones was represented by
Carlie Christensen, and defendant Collection Management Agency
was represented by Ralph C. Amott.
submitted on behalf of all parties.

Legal memoranda were
Counsel argued the motions

extensively, after which the matter was taken under advisement.
The court now being fully advised, sets forth its Memorandum
Decision and Order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 17, 1988, plaintiff Gary Facio wrote and
issued a check in the amount of $8.71 to a Salt Lake City eating

establishment known as HIRES.

Subsequently, the check was

dishonored for insufficient funds by plaintiff's bank and
returned to HIRES unpaid.

On or about April 15, 1988, after

receiving notice that the check was not paid, plaintiff mailed a
money order in the amount of $10.00 to HIRES to cover the check
and to help defray any additional costs.

On April 29, 1988,

defendant Collection Management Agency, Inc., commenced a civil
action, on behalf of HIRES, against the plaintiff in the Third
Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Sandy department, for collection
of the dishonored check.

Facio was properly served with a

Summons and Complaint on May 6, 1988, but believing the matter
had been handled with the money order, failed to file an Answer.
On June 2, 1988, a default was taken in the Third Circuit Court,
and on June 9, 1988 default judgment was entered against him in
the amount of $190.46.
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and
60(b), a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment was filed on
August 23, 1988, in the Third Circuit Court.

On September 22,

1988, a hearing was held in the Third Circuit Court on Facio1s
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment.

The Honorable Maurice

Jones, in accordance with pronouncements of the Supreme Court of
Utah, denied the Motion on the basis that Facio failed to offer
proof of a meritorious defense.

On September 28, 1988, a

Satisfaction of Judgment was entered in Third Circuit Court by

2

Collection Management Agency.

However, the Satisfaction of

Judgment was facilitated by reason of garnishment against Facio's
wages and on his bank account.
Plaintiff Facio seeks declaratory relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983* for deprivation of property without due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

Specifically, plaintiff contends that Judge Jones'

application of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c)2 and 60(b)3 is
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the,Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes
of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the
court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance
with Rule 60(b).
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c).
3

(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
3

unconstitutional to the extent that a defendant is required to
offer proof of a meritorious defense when seeking to set aside a
default judgment.

By pendent claim, plaintiff challenges the

validity of the default and default judgment entered against him.
Defendant Judge Jones contends that this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims, that the claims are
moot, that his application of Rules 55(c) and 60(b) in accordance
with precedent established by the Supreme Court of Utah is
constitutional, and that in any event he is immune from suit as a
matter of law.

The parties have filed cross motions for summary

judgment.

misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)
when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and
the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of
a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
4

LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Utah Supreme Court in effect has promulgated a
court rule that under Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure a defendant must offer proof of a meritorious
defense to an action before a default judgment can be set aside.
State of Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667*P.2d
1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983); Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322, 1323
(Utah 1979); Downey State Bank v. Maior-Blakenev Corp., 545 P. 2d
507, 510 (Utah 1979).

In its most recent pronouncement in

Musselman, the court stated:
In order for defendant to be relieved from
the default judgment, he must not only show
that the judgment was entered against him
through excusable neglect (or any other
reason specified in Rule 60(b)), but he must
also show that his motion to set aside the
judgment was timely, and that he has a
meritorious defense to the action.
Notwithstanding defendant's showing of
timeliness and excusable neglect, unless he
can show "some defense of at least ostensible
merit as would justify a trial of the issue
thus raised," his motion to set aside cannot
justifiably be granted.
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1055-56 (quoting Downey State Bank, 545 P.2d
at 510) (footnotes omitted).

The rationale for requiring the

showing of a meritorious defense before a default judgment is set
aside appears to be that in terms of judicial economy courts
should not be occupied with cases that can be disposed of
summarily where no meritorious defense to the claim exists.

5

In

this case Judge Jones simply followed the precedents established
by the Utah Supreme Court.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Declaratory Judgment Action
Defendants contend that this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because of lack of jurisdiction to review decisions
of state courts.

It is urged that in order to assess the

constitutionality of his application of Rules 55(c) and 60(b) in
this case, this court will be required to review Judge Jones'
decision.
It is clearly established law that the Supreme Court
has the exclusive power to review state court decisions.4
However, federal trial courts can adjudicate civil rights
complaints such as that brought by plaintiff without directly
reviewing state court decisions.5

The Tenth Circuit recognized

4

Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Enq'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286, 296 (1970).
5

District courts have original jurisdiction of civil
actions:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color
of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982).
6

this distinction in Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d
1429 (10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
Razatos was an attorney who had been suspended from practice by
the Colorado Supreme Court.

He brought an action in federal

district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory relief
that the Colorado procedure for disciplining attorneys violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The district

court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.6

The Tenth Circuit reversed on the subject matter

jurisdiction issue because of the distinction between challenging
a particular state disciplinary proceeding and a general
constitutional attack on state rules governing discipline.

The

court said that "district courts are . . . required to
distinguish between general challenges to state bar rules as
promulgated and challenges to state court decisions in particular
cases."

Id. at 1433.

The court recognized that it would be

inappropriate to review a particular state court proceeding and
upheld the lower court on that aspect of its ruling, stating:
M

[T]o the extent Razatos sought review in the district court of

6

Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 549 F.Supp. 798 (D.
Colo. 1982). Under the Colorado scheme, the Colorado Supreme
Court makes the final factual determination as to whether an
attorney should be disciplined. Razatos argued that Colorado
Rule of Civil Procedure 252 as construed violated the due process
clause because the final fact finders did not have an opportunity
to hold a hearing and assess credibility prior to Razatos'
suspension.
7

the judicial decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, the district
court properly refused to hear his complaint."

Ld. at 1432.

The Tenth Circuit in Razatos concluded that Razatos1
constitutional challenge was not "inextricably intertwined" with
the state court decision so as to require review of the rule's
application.7

The court said:

"In order to evaluate this claim,

the district court need not review the decision of the Colorado
Supreme Court.

It need only look at Rule 252 as promulgated, and

as construed by state case law."
in the case at hand.

Id. at 1434.

The same is true

This court is simply being asked to render

a ruling on a claim for declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
that as promulgated and construed by Utah case law, Rules 55(c)
and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deprive the
plaintiff of property without due process.

In those

circumstances, this court is not acting as an appellate court to

7

In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman. 460
U.S. 462 (1983), the Supreme Court recognized the distinction
between challenging a rule as promulgated and practiced, and
challenging a particular state court decision. The Feldman court
stated:
If the constitutional claims presented to a
United States District Court are inextricably
intertwined with the state court's denial in
a judicial proceeding . . . then the District
Court is in essence being called upon to
review the state-court decision•
Id. at 483-484 n. 16.

8

review a decision of the Third Circuit Court of the State of
Utah.
Pendent Claim Jurisdiction
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966), the Supreme Court stated that pendent claim jurisdiction
exists "whenever there is a claim 'arising under [the]
constitution1 . . . and the relationship between that claim and
the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action
before the court comprises but one constitutional case."

Over

time, the Supreme Court has developed a three-prong test for
assessing whether a federal court should exercise jurisdiction
over a pendent state claim.

The test requires examination of the

court's power to exercise jurisdiction, its discretion in
exercising that power, and whether Congressional intent would
preclude such exercise.
As to the first prong, in United Mine Workers the court
said that federal courts must have power to exercise pendent
jurisdiction:
The state and federal claims must derive from
a common nucleus of operative fact. But if,
considered without regard to their federal or
state character, a plaintiff's claims are
such that he would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming substantiality of the federal
issues there is power in federal courts to
hear the whole.

9

Id. (footnote omitted).

In this regard, a plaintiff's claim must

not be "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior
decisions . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to
involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the
District Court . . . "

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974)

(quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,
666-67 (1974)).
With respect to the second prong, "justification [for
pendent jurisdiction] lies in considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants . . . "
Workers, 383 U.S. at 726.

United Mine

The court thus recognized that pendent

jurisdiction is a doctrine of judicial discretion and that a
trial court has discretion to exercise its power when to do
otherwise would result in duplicative proceedings.
To satisfy the third prong, a trial court must examine
the particular statute which confers jurisdiction over the
federal claim in order to determine whether Congress intended to
prevent pendent state claims.

In this regard, the Supreme Court

has said:
[T]here must be an examination of the posture
in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and
of the specific statute that confers
jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order
to determine whether "Congress in [that
statute] has . . . expressly or by
implication negated" the exercise of
jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal
claim.

10

Owen Equip. & Erection Co, v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978),
(quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)).
In the pendent claim in this case, plaintiff asks this
court to set aside the default and default judgment.

The three-

prong test for assessing the exercise of jurisdiction over that
pendent state claim is satisfied.

As to the power to exercise

pendent jurisdiction, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
authorize federal courts to entertain suits brought to redress
the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution, and it is
clear that all of plaintiff's claims arose out of the same set of
operative facts.

Under the second prong it is manifest that

refusal to exercise discretion in asserting pendent jurisdiction
in this case would require duplicative proceedings which would
not serve the ends of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to the litigants.

Finally, under the third prong there is no

reason to believe that Congress did not intend pendent state
claims to be considered along with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.6
Mootness
Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims are barred
by mootness because the judgment against the plaintiff was

8

Federal courts routinely take jurisdiction over pendent
state claims when 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) confer
jurisdiction over the federal claim. Anderson v. Reynolds. 34 2
F.Supp. 101, 110 (D. Utah 1972) aff'd, 476 F.2d 665 (10th Cir.
1973) .
11

satisfied on September 28, 1988.

Under the facts of this case,

however, the judgment was involuntarily satisfied and the
vitality of the plaintiff's grievance continues to exist*

In

Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74
(1963) , the Supreme Court addressed an analogous question.

In

that case, a labor dispute existed which provoked the Governor of
Missouri effectively to seize a public transit business.
Although the seizure was terminated after the appellant filed a
jurisdictional statement with the United State Supreme Court, the
court held that the claim was not moot.

The court stated:

lf

[T]he labor dispute [giving rise to the seizure] remains

unresolved.

There thus exists in the present case not merely the

speculative possibility of invocation of the [Act under which the
governor seized the business] in some future labor dispute, but
the presence of an existing unresolved dispute which continues.
. . ."

Id. at 77.
In the case at bar, as in Motor Coach Employees, an

unresolved dispute exists.

Here, the dispute is whether

requiring the showing of a meritorious defense in order to set a
default judgment aside is constitutional.

Acting under the

precedent of applicable Utah Supreme Court decisions, state court
judges will continue to refuse to set aside default judgments in
the absence of the showing of a meritorious defense.

Therefore,

the issue presented by plaintiff in this case is not precluded by

12

the mootness doctrine.
The Utah Supreme Court has said:
The principles that determine . . .
justiciability . • . are the well-established
rules which permit a court to litigate an
issue which, although technically moot as to
a particular litigant at the time of appeal,
is of wide concern, affects the public
interest, is likely to recur in a similar
manner, and, because of the brief time any
one person is affected, would otherwise
likely escape judicial review. . . .
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981) (citation
omitted).
The matter before this court is of wide concern and
affects the public interest in that citizens similarly situated
are affected by the requirement that a meritorious defense must
be shown to exist in order to set aside a default judgment.
Furthermore, because a motion to set aside a default judgment is
usually made within three months,9 a litigant otherwise would
have a very short period of time in which to bring a complaint
like the one at hand.

Under the circumstances, this court holds

that plaintiff's claims are not moot.
Judicial Immunity
It is a well established principle in our judicial
system that judges are immune from liability for their acts
committed in a judicial capacity.

9

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
13

"[A] judge is entitled to

judicial immunity if he has not acted in clear absence of all
jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial one."

Martinez v.

Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978))-

See also Navajo Nation v.

District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 130, 136 (D. Utah
1985).

The principle of judicial immunity does not apply,

however, when the plaintiff simply seeks declaratory and
prospective injunctive relief rather than monetary damages.

That

narrow exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity applies
here.

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).10

However, under

the special circumstances of this case an award of attorneys fees
against Judge Jones would be unjust.
Constitutionality of the Utah Procedural Rules as Construed
In Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 108 S.Ct.
896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988), the Heights Medical Center sued
Peralta under his guarantee of a hospital debt incurred by one of
his employees.

Peralta did not answer or appear and a default

judgment was entered against him.

The judgment was recorded, a

writ of attachment was issued, and unbeknownst to Peralta his
real property was sold to satisfy the judgment.

Thereafter,

In Pulliam, the respondents sought to enjoin a state
magistrate from requiring bond for a nonincarcerable offense.
The court said: "We conclude that judicial immunity is not a bar
to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer
acting in her judicial capacity." Pulliam. 466 U.S. at 541-42.
14

Peralta began a bill of review proceeding to set aside the
default judgment.

Heights Medical Center filed a motion for

summary judgment asserting that in order to have the default
judgment set aside Peralta must show a meritorious defense to the
action in which judgment had been entered.
he did not have a meritorious defense.
was granted summary judgment.

Peralta conceded that

Heights Medical Center

On appeal to the Texas Court of

Appeals, Peralta repeated his claim that requiring a meritorious
defense violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but the court affirmed
and held that whether or not there was proper service and notice,
the showing of a meritorious defense was required in order to set
aside a default judgment.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court

reversed and said:
The Texas court held that the default
judgment must stand absent a showing of a
meritorious defense to the action in which
judgment was entered without proper notice to
appellant, a judgment that had substantial
adverse consequences to appellant. By reason
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that holding is plainly infirm.
Where a person has been deprived of property
in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets
of due process, "it is no answer to say that
in this particular case due process of law
would have led to the same result because he
had no adequate defense upon the merits."
Peralta, 99 L.Ed.2d at 82 (quoting Coe v. Armour Fertilizer
Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424, 59 L.Ed. 1027, 35 S.Ct. 625 (1915)).

15

Defendants contend that Peralta is distinguishable
because in that case deficiencies existed in the service of
process and notice and that these defects constituted an
underlying due process violation.

However, if the Supreme Court

had considered Peralta strictly to be a failed notice case, it
could have decided the matter on the basis of Mullane v.*Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

Mullane is

the touchstone case for the fundamental due process requirement
that reasonable notice must be given.

It appears that the

Supreme Court went beyond Mullane when it decided Peralta by
effectively holding that a procedural rule which requires the
showing of a meritorious defense is unconstitutional when that
requirement is imposed in addition to procedural requirements
which otherwise would justify setting aside a default judgment.
This court interprets Peralta to stand for the proposition that
it is a denial of due process of law to foreclose consideration
of setting aside a default judgment because of a required showing
of a meritorious defense.

When a default judgment otherwise

should be set aside because of improper notice or for any of the
grounds set forth in rules 55(c) and 60(b), such as mistake or
inadvertence, to impose the additional requirement of showing the
existence of a meritorious defense is to deny a defendant due
process.

16

In addition to the philosophy expressed by the Supreme
Court in Peralta, there are other reasons to reject a procedural
requirement that default judgments cannot be vacated in the
absence of a showing of the existence of a meritorious defense.
In this regard, requiring a defendant to make such a showing at
the time he seeks to set aside a default judgment on otherwise
permissible grounds denies that defendant the right to a
substantive day in court.

Setting aside a default judgment is a

procedural matter, and to go straight to the substantive merits
on a procedural motion is unfair.

All litigants are entitled to

a day in court, even if it is a short one.

It is contended that

a defendant will suffer no real harm or prejudice by reason of
the requirement because the same judgment likely would be
rendered a second time anyway.

However, oftentimes the course of

proceedings would be substantially altered if a default judgment
were vacated even though the defendant never makes a showing of a
meritorious defense.

For instance, if the default judgment had

been set aside in this case, plaintiff may have negotiated a
settlement with the Collection Agency, or paid the debt before he
suffered the embarrassment of having his wages garnished.
Finally, it is manifest that judicial economy is not a valid
basis or reason to justify the violation of constitutional
rights.

17

Based upon the foregoing, the promulgated procedural
rule of court which imposes the showing of a meritorious defense
in addition to other requirements of Rules 55(c) and 60(b)
U.R.C.P. before a default judgment can be vacated, is declared to
be unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment is granted and the default judgment entered by
the Third Circuit Court against plaintiff is set aside.
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to lodge with the
court a form of judgment consistent with this memorandum decision
and order, after compliance with local rule 13(e).
DATED:

May

. 1989.

J. THOMAS GREENE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES TO: 5/30/89:
Brian M. Barnard, Esq.
Ralph C. Amott,Esq.
Carlie Christensen, Esq.
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